Category Archives: Forum

The SANSAD Forum is a space for the discussion of issues of urgent concern to members and friends of SANSAD. Its goal is to develop understanding, solidarity, and direction for change. People are welcome to propose issues that concern them, explaining their urgency if necessary, and focusing them into questions as much as possible. Both questions and responses will be published on the site at the discretion of the moderator. People who raise questions are advised to request particular individuals whose response they consider valuable by email. Comments can be posted directly on the site.

Published opinions are solely the responsibility of the authors and may not be attributed to SANSAD.

Security and justice for hill tribes in Bangladesh


#illridewithyou: Bijoy Dibos in Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT)

by Kabita Chakma for

Perhaps the spirit of Bijoy Dibosh can rekindle the hearts of millions of Bangladeshis to do what is honourable. Just as #illridewithyou helped assure the safety and security of Australian Muslims, the spirit of Bijoy Dibosh may help bring safety and security to indigenous peoples in the CHT.

On 16 December 2014, I added the tweet #illridewithyou to my Facebook page. Sixteenth December: Bijoy Dibosh; Bangladesh Victory Day; the victory of justice over injustice.

#illridewithyou was a remarkable Australian twitter campaign in support of Muslim women. It began in very sad circumstances.  On the morning of 15 December, a deluded armed man, who media described as ‘self-styled Sheikh Man Haron Monis’, a Muslim cleric with criminal history, took 17 staff and customers hostage at the Lindt Cafe in Martin Place, Sydney.  The 16 hour siege in my resident city ended in the early hours of 16 December. It cost the lives of two innocent hostages and the perpetrator.

Following the incident, there was fear of a backlash against members of the Muslim community. There were reports that many Muslims were reluctant to take public transports. A woman named Rachel Jacobs saw a distressed Muslim woman on a train taking off her hijab. When they got off the train, Jacobs went up to the woman and said ‘put it back on. I’ll walk with you’.  In response, the woman hugged Jacobs and cried.

A Twitter solidarity campaign #illridewithyou emerged out of social media discussions of Jacobs’ act of kindness.  It voiced support for Muslim women. The support spread throughout Australia.  ABC news
reported that #illridewithyou was ‘rising by hundreds of tweets per minute. Within hours it had been used in almost 120,000 tweets’. The solidarity campaign was also repeated in many parts of the world.


Completing my Facebook status, I learnt about the murder of Umraching Marma (Chabi), a Year 8 school girl, on 15 December of last year.  Her throat was allegedly slit by two Bengali settlers, Mohammad Nizam Uddin (aged 19/20) and Masud Rana (aged 19) from a village of Kaptai, in the CHT. She had been working on her family’s jum farm collecting vegetables. The accused confessed that she was murdered resisting rape.

Is murder of minors like Umraching unusual in the CHT?

A 2013 submission on CHT Jumma indigenous rural women, under Article 14 of CEDAW, notes that a high number of indigenous women have been sexually assaulted, raped, and murdered by non-indigenous men during daily activities, such as going to and from work on farms, tending cattle, collecting food and firewood from the forest, fetching water, and going to school, markets and temples.  It stressed that sexual violence against Jumma women by settlers has intensified with the increased mobility of settlers in the post-Accord CHT. Indigenous women of all ages are losing their freedom of movement in the CHT.

Kapaeeng Foundation documented that in the last 7 years, till April 2014, 96% of the alleged perpetrators of violence against indigenous women in the CHT are committed by Bengali settlers and the other 4% are by law enforcement officers. It claimed that while sexual violence against CHT women was used initially as a ‘weapon of war’, and was later used for land grabbing. (Sexual Violence against Indigenous Women, The Daily Star, 21 December 2014).

Police work on the Umraching murder case has been exemplary. The victim’s father was able to file a case with the local police station. In many previous cases filing a case accusing a Bengali man of rape
was difficult.  The police took immediate action to arrest the men and bring them before the court. Earlier this year the alleged rape and murder of 30 year old mother of two Sabita Chakma received different treatment. Police initially refused to file the case.

Amnesty International pointed out that in the Sabita murder case ‘the local police superintendent, when reporting that no arrests had been made, stated that: “The upazila parishad election was our first priority. Arresting someone could have raised Bangalee-Pahari tensions. So, we are taking our time.”’

Amnesty International added that ‘in cases where indigenous women report rape by Bengali settlers, doctors are pressured by the authorities to report no evidence of rape in their medical reports, arguing that a finding of rape would contribute to tensions between Indigenous Peoples and Bengalis.’ (Livewire: Amnesty’s global human rights blog, 24 June 2014).  The well known 1996 Kalpana Chakma abduction case still awaits effective police action.

Since 2009, when the Women and Children Repression Prevention Tribunals came to the CHT, their effective functioning has been insipid.  A 2014 CHT Commission report ‘Marginalisation and Impunity:
Violence Against Women and Girls in the Chittagong Hill Tracts’ recorded a total of 215 cases of violence against women from January 2010 to December 2011. Of these, 166 cases were served with charge
sheets.  Only 9 of these cases were tried, with no convictions. Human rights organisations speculate that absolute impunity enjoyed by perpetrators remains the major reason for continuation of sexual violence against indigenous women in the CHT.

The Umraching murder was not the only news on Bijoy Dibosh. A national Bangla daily revealed that on that day there were arson attacks on indigenous peoples of the CHT at Bogachari, in Rangamati, allegedly by ‘some miscreants’.  On that day also hundreds of innocent children were allegedly murdered by Taliban militia in Peshwar.

Later reporting of the Bogachari arson stated that at least 50 homes and 7 shops owned by indigenous people in 3 villages were torched, allegedly by Bengali settlers in the presence of and with the active participation of some military personnel. The arson attackers also vandalised Karuna Kutir, a Buddhist temple, physically abused monks, and looted seven bronze Buddha statues.  Police suggested that the arson attack was retaliation by settlers in response to the destruction of part of Asfar Ali’s pineapple and teak plantation by indigenous persons. Media reporting further revealed that Asfar Ali had previously grabbed the land from Padma Ranjan Chakma.

Grabbing of land belonging to indigenous peoples by Bengali settlers, powerful Bengalis and organisations, often using terror and deceit, has been practiced in the CHT since the late 1970s.  Asfar Ali’s apparent land grabbing again brings sharp attention to the government’s failure to establish a just and functioning Land Commission, which is an important provision of the 1997 CHT Accord. The Bogachari arson poignantly shows how the full implementation of the CHT Accord is necessary to a just Bangladesh.

Harm was done to the people of Bogachari. There has been no judicial investigation. An 11 member probe committee has been set up to inquire about the arson.  Such committees should not replace proper legal procedures. It is the responsibility of the government and its institutions to ensure the law is followed. Those who destroyed the plantations, those who took the law into their own hands by torching 3 villages, vandalising and looting the Karuna Kutir temple, and those involved in land grabbing must be brought to justice.  Those charged with maintaining law and order, but instead thwart it, must also be brought to justice.

In the days after Bijoy Dibosh, we learnt that the arson victim’s families, including babies and the elderly, are homeless in December’s harsh winter. Living conditions for them are harsh, however, they demand nothing but safety and security from the state. They refused to accept relief in the form of food, grain, metal roofing sheets and cash assistance offered by the government on 18 December.  Only when Mostafa Kamal, the Rangamati Deputy Commissioner, made assurances of security, did the victims accept the metal roofing sheets.  It is imperative that all victims of Bogachari be justly compensated.

While the events that occurred on and around the Bijoy Dibosh in Australia and Bangladesh are quite different, one connection is that both the Muslims in Australia, and the indigenous peoples in Bangladesh, are minorities in their lands. Both deserve safety and security.

In Australia it was inspiring to see the flood of floral tributes at the hostage site in Martin Place, from people of every walk of life. On 21 December, Manal Kassem, a Muslim bride in her bridal dress and
wearing a hijab and veil, along with her bridal party, visited the memorial site.  She added her wedding bouquet to the floral tributes. reported that Kassem ‘did it out of respect for her
country [Australia], that will one day be the country of her children and grandchildren.’

There is a reasonably good public confidence in Australia that its law and order system offers safety and security for all.  The mass public campaign #illridewithyou, which touched people’s hearts, will further
strengthen safety and security for the Muslim community in Australia.

Is it possible to achieve the same for indigenous peoples in the CHT?

It may appear difficult. But I have confidence that all Bangladeshis, whether Bengali or non-Bengali, have the capacity to distinguish right from wrong.  They have the capacity to respect justice, to respect humanity, and to stand by the oppressed.

Bijoy Dibosh is significant in marking an end to the injustices of 24 years of cultural, economic, racial and religious oppression suffered by the people of Bangladesh under Pakistan. While the spirit of Bijoy Dibosh, which represents victory over injustice, is weakened by incidents like the Bogachari arson and the murder of Umraching, the police’s dutiful work in bringing Umraching’s murderers to justice is making a difference.

Perhaps the spirit of Bijoy Dibosh can rekindle the hearts of millions of Bangladeshis to do what is honourable. Just as #illridewithyou helped assure the safety and security of Australian Muslims, the
spirit of Bijoy Dibosh may help bring safety and security to indigenous peoples in the CHT.

The significance of Islamist killings in Bangladesh


The origins of recent violence lie in the political, social and cultural divisions that define the country’s history

Activists in Bangladesh take part in a torchlight protest against the killing of a secular blogger
 Activists in Bangladesh take part in a torchlight protest against the killing of a secular blogger. Photograph: Zuma Wire/Rex Shutterstock

The recent murders in secular Bangladesh echo this country’s founding tragedy, when Islamist militias killed 116 intellectuals in the final days of the 1971 war for independence. Since then, religious extremists here have often targeted intellectuals; however, it is clear from the most recent attacks on foreigners, publishers, moderate preachers and policemen that they are now widening their scope.

The drive to reverse our liberal ideals was institutionalised with the killing in 1975 of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the founder of Bangladesh. His successor, the military dictator Ziaur Rahman (Zia), founder of the Bangladesh Nationalist party (BNP), used religion to bolster his regime; he restored to politics the Jamaat-e-Islami, a party that had opposed the creation of the country and which had collaborated with the Pakistani army. The dictator who succeeded him in 1981 declared that Islam would be the state religion. Zia’s widow, Khaleda Zia, continued an electorally profitable liaison with Jamaat; and as prime minister in 2001 she welcomed war criminals into her cabinet.

The late 1990s saw the onset of violent extremism against targets viewed as un-Islamic, and in the early 2000s Humayun Azad and Shamsur Rahman, two prominent poets, were attacked with knives for their alleged anti-Islamic views.

BNP’s last term (2001-06) saw the rise of terrorist groups such as Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), which was behind the grenade attacks that killed leaders of the then opposition Awami League party.

When one side in our two-party system plays the religion card it threatens our secular values. Since 2001, BNP’s abjuring of any allegiance to such an ideal has been devastating.

Yet our culture of pluralism has so far provided the bulwark against intolerant ideologies: tellingly, in a nation that is 90% Muslim, Jamaat has consistently failed to raise its support above single digits. But culture can withstand only so much assault.

The erosion of liberal values in the political sphere has been accompanied by compromises at social levels. The middle class, previously insulated from hardline sermons, is now saturated by these messages via satellite TV and social media. The intrusion of such sentiments at all levels has led to instances such as an imam in a mosque in the capital referring to Shia Muslims as apostates, or a national cricketer compelled to remove a photo of goddess Durga from his Facebook page after protests that he had offended Muslim sentiments.

In a culture that has long prided itself on its pluralism, such incidents were once unthinkable; now they are greeted with apathy or fear: moderate Muslims are afraid to protest against hardliners, wary of being called un-Islamic themselves.

Indeed, the whole of our society has shifted – not quite to a point of no return – but to a parlous state. Progressives have trusted “culture” to take care of them, without doing enough to take care of culture in turn.

Since returning to power in 2009 the Awami League has bravely pursued an international war crimes tribunal focusing on the crimes perpetrated during the 1971 liberation war. Yet at the same time it has pursued a scorched-earth policy against BNP-Jamaat, leaving those parties with little stake in our country’s future. The rise in extremist violence is in part a result of that breakdown of political space. The trials too have angered and given a focus to disparate extremist groups. The Awami League appears shockingly unprepared for the predictable fallout of its hardline tactics.

The League presents itself as a guardian of secular values, but that claim is wearing thin in the party’s meek response to the attacks blighting our country. The government’s failure to protect targets on public hitlists is bad enough. Its half-hearted pursuit of criminals after the event is worse. But its strategic failure shows most deeply after each terrible incident when some minister moans about the need not to offend “religious sentiment”. Having pushed things to breaking point, the Awami League cannot dodge responsibility by blaming the victim.

The Awami League, which appears increasingly opportunistic in its putative defence of secularism, might have the moral satisfaction of knowing itself to be the ill-equipped firefighter, not the arsonist – but only for so long. Make no mistake: this is a fire that shall leave no one unscorched.

K Anis Ahmed, publisher of the Dhaka Tribune and the Bangla Tribune, is the author of fiction works The World in My Hands and Good Night, Mr Kissinger 

Writers return honors in protest


Another Writer Returns Award, Says, ‘Not The Free India I Lived In’

Another Writer Returns Award, Says, 'Not The Free India I Lived In'

Sara Joseph is the latest to join protest by writers and poets who have resigned and turned down honours in recent weeks.

Thrissur, Kerala:   Joining an increasing number of writers and poets who have returned honours and given up positions in recent weeks, author Sara Joseph said today that she is returning the Sahitya Akademi Award that she received in 2003.

“There is a growing fear and lack of freedom under the present government,” said the writer who had won the award for her Malayalam novel Alahayude Penmakkal.

Condemning the murder of rationalist writer MM Kalburgi and the mob killing of a 50-year-old man in Uttar Pradesh’s Dadri allegedly over rumours that he had eaten beef, she said, “Writers are being killed, people are being killed, ghazal singers are not being allowed to perform – this is not the free India I have lived in.”

The Sahitya Akademi has remained silent over all of this, when it should have been the first to speak out. I am returning my award in protest,” Ms Joseph said.

Joining her, noted poet from Kerala K Satchidanandan and short story writer PK Parakkadavu resigned from their official posts in Sahitya Akademi committees. Mr Satchidanandan had earlier asked the Akademi to pass a resolution against them killing of Mr Kalburgi.

Ms Joseph is the latest to join a protest by writers and poets who have resigned and turned down honours in recent weeks. Yesterday, novelist Shashi Deshpande offered her resignation from the Sahitya Akademi General Council denouncing “growing intolerance” in the country. Urdu novelist Rehman Abbas also returned his 2011 Sahitya Akademi Award on the same day.

Earlier noted writers Nayantara Sahgal and poet Ashok Vajpeyi had returned their literary honours to protest what they termed as an “assault on right to freedom of both life and expression”.

Reducing Religious and Sectarian Violence in Pakistan

By Dur-e-Aden

Whether it’s the shooting of 14 year old girls, killing of 146 school children, targeted killings of Shia doctors, bombings of places of worships of different Muslim sects, or mob violence against minorities, Pakistan is always in the news for the wrong reasons. The country whose name literally translates to “the land of the pure,” has become synonymous with the idea of religious extremism.

On 11 August 1947, three days before Pakistan’s official date of independence, Pakistan’s founding father, Muhammad Ali Jinnah gave his first speech to the constituent assembly of Pakistan. His exact words were as follows:

You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place or worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed — that has nothing to do with the business of the State. As you know, history shows that in England conditions, some time ago, were much worse than those prevailing in India today. The Roman Catholics and the Protestants persecuted each other. Even now there are some States in existence where there are discriminations made and bars imposed against a particular class. Thank God, we are not starting in those days. We are starting in the days where there is no discrimination, no distinction between one community and another, no discrimination between one caste or creed and another. We are starting with this fundamental principle: that we are all citizens, and equal citizens, of one State…you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus, and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State. (Pakistan Movement Historical Documents)

However, in today’s Pakistan, Jinnah’s promise of equal citizenship for all its citizens seems far and far away.


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If Pakistan’s founder had such a clear vision of what Pakistan was supposed to be like, how did it get to the position where it is today? There are as many theories as there are scholars as to what went wrong with Pakistan. Was it the partition itself, the trauma that accompanied it, the resulting rivalry with India, the continued alliance with the US, the war in Afghanistan, military regimes, or the corrupt civilian governments…the list goes on and on.  However, the purpose of this report is less on what went wrong, and more on what can be done to make it right.

I begin this report by briefly discussing the origins of Pakistan’s identity debate, which resulted in an evolving relationship of religion with the state and the society. I then discuss how the propagation of a certain kind of religion by the state led to an increase in polarization within the society, of which the current situation is an outcome. I conclude this report by giving certain recommendations, especially with regards to minority rights in Pakistan, and the role of the diaspora, who I believe can play a productive role in changing the drastic conditions within their homeland.

The Identity Debate: 

Pakistan was created in the name of Islam, therefore, it is supposed to be an Islamic country. If not, why did it separate from India in the first place? This is a common charge that is often heard from the political right, especially the religious parties (Devji 2013). On the other hand, the political left has Jinnah’s 11 August speech (mentioned above), as well as his own secular credentials and lifestyle on their side (Hamdani 2013). So what kind of country was Pakistan supposed to be? Jinnah died just a year after the creation of Pakistan without drafting any constitution which would determine the country’s future trajectory. However, as long as Jinnah was alive, his practical steps corroborated his inclusive vision of this new country. He appointed Sir Zafarullah Khan, who was an Ahmadi, as the first Foreign Minister of Pakistan. Moreover, the very first Law Minister of Pakistan was a Hindu named Jogendra Nath Mandal. The appointment of the law minister is particularly interesting since it gives rise to the question; if Jinnah wanted an Islamic state with Sharia law, why would he appoint a Hindu law minister? Shouldn’t he have appointed an Islamic scholar? Nevertheless, after his death, a document known as The Objectives Resolution was passed on March 12, 1949, which steered the country’s direction towards a path where religion would hold some sway over the matters of the state (Haqqani 2005).

The very first constitution of Pakistan was passed in 1956, which declared Pakistan as an “Islamic” Republic. This constitution was suspended in 1962 when Ayub Khan’s military government took over. The new constitution drafted during his government took out the word “Islamic” and declared Pakistan just as a “Republic.” Nevertheless, that constitution was also suspended by the subsequent governments and the current constitution, which was passed in 1973 during the reign of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, declares Pakistan as an “Islamic Republic.”


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Religion and the state:

A renowned Pakistani scholar, Ayesha Siddiqa argues that after Jinnah, subsequent governments in Pakistan emphasized a singular identity of Islam in order to legitimize their rule, and to unite an ethnically and linguistically divided society. However, once religion comes into the political arena, it cannot be controlled in a way one would like, since others in that arena can also use it according to their own purposes (Siddiqa 2014). It is interesting to note that before partition, Jinnah himself thought along the same lines. He disagreed with Gandhi’s use of religion, even when it was to emphasize non-violence and create intra-communal harmony. William Darlymple argues that according to Jinnah, “it was a crime to mix up politics and religion the way [Gandhi] had done,” as “doing so emboldened religious chauvinists on all sides” (Darlymple 2015). Ironically, the same thing happened in the country that he created. Elites who were in charge of the state wanted to use religion because it bolstered their credibility, however, they were not knowledgeable in its subject matter. As a result, they ended up giving space to religious scholars, who then interpreted religion according to their own interests and/or understanding. This power made them a formidable pressure group and they were able to exert a considerable influence in the matters of the state despite being out of electoral power. This led to a change in both the laws of the state, as well as the curriculum in schools (Siddiqa 2014). Some of the most visible examples of these changes were the second amendment to the 1973 constitution, which officially declared Ahmadis to be non-Muslims, and the modifications in the pre-existing blasphemy laws during Zia ul Haq’s era which specifically targeted minorities. Finally, religious minorities were excluded from holding high level offices, such as those of President or Prime Minister, in Pakistan (Yousaf 2015).

Now we have a society where religious parties control the ideological narrative or discourse, even if they are not in the electoral power. Not to mention that the increased interference of religion in the state led to an increase in the violence against minorities. Before 1986, there were only 16 Blasphemy related cases in the country. That number has gone up to 1300 over the last three decades (Yousaf 2015). It happened because discrimination on the basis of religion was made legal by the state. Furthermore, since in a religious state, sovereignty belongs to God and not the people, mere accusations of blasphemy have started to result in mob violence. Now, people don’t even wait for a case to get to the court so that the accused can get a fair hearing. Their argument is that blasphemy is a violation against God’s law, and if state cannot prevent it, we have a right to take the law in our own hands, since “the laws of God take precedence over the laws of man” (Lieven 2012).


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Current Situation: 

According to the data available at South Asia Terrorism Portal, since 2003, approximately 20487 civilians have lost their lives in terrorist violence. Further, according to the Pew Research Centre’s report (based on the data collected from 2007-2012), Pakistan topped the list of countries with most religious hostilities (Pew 2014). Pew’s most recent report also includes Pakistan among the countries with highest restrictions on religion (Pew 2015). Since its inception in 1947, over 20,000 Shias have been killed in Pakistan (Shahid 2012).

While society is going through this increased polarization, state is not fulfilling its basic duties of protecting its citizens. Increasingly, hate speeches by religious clerics go unchecked, Madrassas imparting a restricted and narrow world view are not regulated, and as a result, create a generation of militants which is increasingly challenging the writ of the state itself. In other words, state is still facing violence from religious militants who think that despite incorporating religion in the constitution, Pakistani state is not “Islamic” enough. The most famous episode of this phenomenon was the incident of the Red Mosque in 2007, when military was in confrontation with the faculty and students of a madrassa, who wanted their form of Sharia law to be the official version of the state (CBC News 2007; Al Jazeera 2013)

The most surprising and depressing aspect of the current situation is that people are not ready to accept the severity of the problem. Part of it has to do with the global politics after 9/11 and the increased victimization of Muslims worldwide. As a result, Pakistanis have come to view the problems within their own state as a result of these global policies, and the debate over internal reform is not taking place with the same vigour as it should. In other words, the society is becoming latently radicalized. Ayesha Siddiqa defines latent radicalization “as the tendency to be exclusive instead of inclusive vis-à-vis other communities on the basis of religious belief. Such an attitude forces people to develop bias against an individual, a community, a sub-group or a nation on how faith is interpreted for them.”  Moreover, in this narrative, one’s own group is seen as the righteous one and others are held responsible for all ills. A person doesn’t necessarily have to be violent at this stage, but this kind of radicalism makes the mind vulnerable to accept the message from militant organizations (Siddiqa 2010).

Therefore, after every terrorist attack, while people condemn the violence, they often don’t accept that its causes might have more to do with Pakistan’s own policies, and the relationship between the religion and the state, as opposed to external factors (Almeida 2014). Christine Fair argues that Pakistani government can tie the country’s internal threats with external threats, for example, by saying that Pakistani Taliban are agents of foreign agencies who want to destabilize the country. And the people who bolster this narrative, the “uncivil” society actors, hold a lot more sway in Pakistan today than the “civil” society actors who genuinely wanting to bring change (Fair 2014).

In such a polarized and volatile environment, it is the responsibility of the leaders to tell the truth. Benazir Bhutto did use to argue that even if foreign countries interfered in Pakistan before, they were acting in their own self-interest, Pakistan was not. Even a child brought up by abusive parents has to take responsibility for itself (Bhutto 1988; Bhutto 2008). That kind of courage is needed in today’s Pakistan to transform the national narrative.


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What can we do? 

Pakistani diaspora is a community of thoughtful and educated citizens who play an important part in their adopted countries. However, as minorities, they are in the best position to understand how important rights such as freedom of speech and freedom of religion are, as they prevent “tyranny of the majority.” Just as you would like to have equal rights as citizens in your adopted countries, it is your responsibility to fight for the rights of minorities in your homeland, along with arguing for a separation of church and state, and universal human rights.

So what can be done? It depends on each individual’s own status and interests.

  • You can donate money to human rights organizations working on the ground in Pakistan
  • You can talk to your MPs in your adopted countries, and pressure them to bring the issues regarding minority persecution while meeting with their Pakistani counterparts
  • You can start online petitions, and write to the politicians within Pakistan to pay attention to this issue, or
  • You can volunteer your time to a cause in Pakistan when you happen to be there.

Our organization, the Maria-Helena Foundation, firmly believes in taking practical steps in addressing these issues in Pakistan, and is already involved with different educational and vocational projects with our Pakistani counterparts. For the purposes of our current project, we argue that promoting respect of elders of minorities will increase their status as sons and daughters of their homeland, and will reduce hatred towards minority communities. Based on this thesis, our recommendations are as follows:

  1. The Government should establish science scholarships in the name of our first Nobel Laureate, Dr. Abdus Salam, and the house where he was born be declared a protected property. His achievements brought prestige to Pakistan as a country, irrespective of any religious affiliation, and we need to promote his status as a learned Pakistani scientist and a role model for future students.
  2. The Lahore Municipal Government should rename Mall Road as Shahra-e Sir Ganga Ram. Sir Ganga Ram was the grandfather of philanthropy in Lahore who help built many schools, hospitals and other buildings during the British rule. Sir Ganga Ram Hospital is just one of his many gifts to the citizens of Lahore.
  3. Similar recommendations should be given to Parsi benefectors of Karachi.


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Source for the image on the right:


Often times, when confronted with huge problems which carry tremendous historical baggage, people get discouraged because they feel that they cannot change these conditions. However, we should remember that every action, no matter how small, has the potential to play an important part in impacting the issue that it targets. Every big historical change, from abolition of slavery to women rights movements, did take a long time before they could challenge deeply entrenched societal and government structures. Not to mention that these struggles are still ongoing, albeit in a different manner. These examples only illustrate that the process of change is ongoing, and that it matters. Therefore, taking action against injustice is the responsibility of thoughtful citizens both in their native and adapted countries. As Margaret Mead put it beautifully, “Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change the world; indeed, it’s the only thing that ever has.”

Dur-e-Aden is a PhD student at University of Toronto where her research focuses on rebel recruitment within Islamist insurgent organizations. She holds a MA in Political Science from University of British Columbia, and tweets @aden1990. She worked as a research intern with the Maria-Helena Foundation during the course of this project. 


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